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Abstract 
This project was done to determine the effectiveness of different methods of mitigating the 
effects of an ammonia release through a pressure relief device in an ammonia refrigeration 
system.  Several methods were considered, and five were selected for further study. The methods 
chosen for further study were discharge into a tank containing standing water, discharge into the 
atmosphere, discharge into a flare, discharge into a wet scrubber, and an emergency pressure 
control system.  Discharge into a tank containing standing water is the most common method in 
existence today but several people in the ammonia refrigeration industry have questioned its 
reliability.   The methods were compared based on a quantitative risk analysis, combining failure 
rates of each system with ammonia dispersion modeling and the monetized health effects of a 
system’s failure to contain an ammonia release. 
 
It was determined that the release height had a greater influence on the downwind cost impact 
than any other variable, including weather conditions and release from multiple sources.  The 
discharge into a tank containing standing water was determined to have the lowest failure rate, 
while the flare system was found to be the most effective in terms of relative overall release 
consequent cost. The emergency pressure control system is now required by the codes, and any 
of the other mitigation systems would be very effective when used in conjunction with the 
emergency pressure control system. 
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Phase 1 
1.0 Introduction 
Ammonia is by far the most common refrigerant chosen as the working fluid in industrial 
refrigeration systems today.  The thermal physical characteristics of ammonia drive this choice 
because ammonia requires a low mass flow rate to achieve a given refrigeration rate, resulting in 
smaller refrigerant charges than would otherwise be needed.  The smaller charge and lower flow 
rate allows for smaller vessel volumes and piping diameters.  The drawback of ammonia is that it 
is a strong irritant and cause human health problems when concentrations reach around 150 ppm 
(v/v).  The health hazards associated with ammonia result in stringent code requirements 
regarding health both in the plant facility and outside the facility’s perimeter.  
 
The applicable codes identify requirements for all refrigeration systems that result in system 
designs that are safe.  Special requirements are identified for large industrial refrigeration 
systems utilizing ammonia.  An important requirement given in the codes for industrial 
refrigeration systems using ammonia involves a means to capture ammonia that may be released 
through a pressure relief valve, thereby preventing the ammonia from leaving the facility.  The 
codes may or may not require specific methods by which the ammonia should be captured, but 
the final decision is usually the responsibility of the local authority having jurisdiction.  The 
codes are in place to limit the quantity of ammonia that leaves the facility’s perimeter and 
jeopardizes the health of the people living and working in the surrounding area.  
 
The objective of Phase 1 of this project is to determine the methods that are employed to capture 
ammonia released from pressure relieving devices at a refrigerating facility.  The pressure relief 
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valves are installed with a set pressure so that they prevent the vessels storing ammonia – high, 
intermediate and low pressure receivers, flash tanks, and others – from structurally failing due to 
high pressure.  In cooperation with the IIAR Project Monitoring Committee, several of these 
methods have been selected for further study and are analyzed on the basis of a quantitative risk 
analysis in Phase 2 of the project.  Ammonia may be released from a refrigeration plant by other 
means than through a pressure relief valve system.  These include: leaks through rotating seals, 
piping structural failures, failures associated with ammonia delivery such as hose leaks; and 
forklifts and other vehicles breaking pipes, valves, or other components. All ammonia releases 
not involving pressure-relief valves are outside the scope of this project. 
2.0 Reference Ammonia Release 
In order to select and design an ammonia capturing system, the mass flow rate of ammonia that 
would be expected to be released must be considered.  This assessment is generally based on the 
mass of ammonia liquid contained in the largest vessel vented over a period of one hour.  In 
practice, it is not likely that all of the ammonia would be vented from the vessel, so this is a 
conservative value.  This is so because of the evaporative cooling lowering the pressure in the 
vessel, Which, in turn, reduces the mass flow of ammonia from the vessel.  Once a safe pressure 
level is achieved inside the vessel, the pressure relief valve will close, shutting off the ammonia 
flow, with some ammonia still remaining in the vessel.  If the vessel is allowed to vent 
sufficiently long to achieve an internal pressure equal to atmospheric pressure, the liquid 
temperature would be -28°F and the vapor flow rate from the vessel would be limited to that 
caused by evaporation driven by heat transfer into the vessel. This project is associated with only 
ammonia releases that occur with the opening of pressure relief valves.  Other ammonia releases 
from the refrigeration equipment occurring from mechanical failure are outside the operating 
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conditions of an ammonia capturing system designed to operate in conjunction with a system’s 
pressure relief valves. 
 
For the purposes of this study, a conservative assumption will be made concerning the pressure 
relief of a vessel.  Namely, the flow of ammonia through the pressure relief valve will continue 
at the rated condition for one hour.  An example of this situation would be if the vessel were 
involved in a facility fire and engulfed in flames.  The thermal energy absorbed by the vessel 
surface by convection and radiation heat transfer is vaporizing the liquid ammonia inside at a 
rate equal to the rated flow of the pressure relief valve.  This condition is used to establish a 
“reference release” and will be the basis for quantitatively comparing the effectiveness of the 
different release mitigation techniques. 
 
The “reference release” is defined based on a typical sized modern refrigerated warehouse with 
both freezer and cooler space.  The refrigeration system is a two-stage vapor compression system 
using ammonia as the refrigerant.  The total refrigeration load is 362 tons which is the sum of the 
-25°F freezer, the +28°F coolers, and the +40°F truck dock.  The largest vessel in this system is 
the high pressure receiver whose dimensions are 60 inches ( 152 cm) diameter and 24 ft (7.3 m) 
long which contains 316 ft3 ( 9.0 m3).  The design condensing temperature is taken as 95oF 
(35oC) giving the liquid mass of ammonia of 11,590 lbm (5,300 kg).   
 
Using ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15-2010 to estimate the needed ammonia flow rate to protect 
the high pressure receiver, the relationship in Equation 1 is applied. 
4 
 
Equation 1: 
     
where  
 f  = 0.5 for ammonia 
 D = vessel internal diameter, ft (m) 
 L = vessel internal length, ft (m) 
 C = ammonia mass flow rate, lbm (air)/min 
For this situation, the value for C is 60 lbm (air)(27.3 kg) per minute.  This corresponds to a flow 
rate of 35.27 lbm (NH3) (16.0 kg) per minute.  The equation is designed for the flow rate of air in 
lbm/minute because of the units of the flow factor f, so the value for C must be converted from 
lbm (air)/min to lbm (NH3) based on the ratio of their molecular weights. Pressure relief valves 
are available from several manufacturers’ meeting this flow capacity.  For a time duration of one 
hour at this rate, the mass of ammonia released is 2,116 lb NH3 (959.8 kg).   
 
This reference release will be applied to each of the methods proposed for handling ammonia 
releases from a refrigeration plant.   
3.0 Application of Codes 
ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15-2010 Safety Standard for Refrigeration Systems establishes many 
requirements relating to the safe operation of a refrigerating facility.  An important code that 
supports Standard 15 is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code – 2010, which addresses 
vessels and piping in particular.  Another code required only by ammonia refrigeration systems 
is ANSI/IIAR 2-2008 published and maintained by the International Institute of Ammonia 
Refrigeration (IIAR) and by its Appendix K presents information useful for “Emergency 
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Pressure Control Systems.”  ANSI/IIAR 2-2008 refers to and draws on information given in 
ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15.  At the local Authority Having Jurisdiction that enforces 
compliance with the applicable codes, the International Fire Code – 2012 or other mechanical 
code can be applied to an individual facility in its design and installation.  These codes also 
reference information from the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes, ANSI/ASHRAE 
Standard 15, and IIAR 2.  The refrigeration system must be compliant with all applicable codes 
before it is permitted to operate. 
 
ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 15, IIAR 2, and the International Fire Code – 2012 have provisions 
requiring, to a varying extent, the capture of ammonia released by pressure relief valves as in this 
project.  It is noted that the codes flag ammonia as an exception from those refrigerants that are 
considered toxic in the requirements related to its capture upon release.  Specifically, Section 
606.12.3 of the International Fire Code, “Ammonia Refrigerant,” states the following: 
 
“Systems containing ammonia refrigerant shall discharge vapor to the atmosphere 
through an approved treatment system in accordance with Section 606.12.4, a flaring 
system in accordance with Section 606.12.4, a flaring system in accordance with Section 
606.12.5, or through an approved ammonia diffusion system in accordance with Section 
606.12.6, or by other approved means.”        
 
and continues with the following exceptions for ammonia: 
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“1. Ammonia/water absorption systems containing less than 22 pounds (10 kg) of 
ammonia and for which the ammonia circuit is located entirely outdoors. 
 
“2. When the fire code official determines, on review of an engineering analysis prepared 
in accordance with Section 104.7.2, that a fire, health or environmental hazard would not 
result from discharging ammonia directly to the atmosphere.   
 
Importantly, the codes do not necessarily require ammonia to be captured at the site of the 
facility. It is possible, depending on the circumstances that exist at the facility (closeness of 
adjacent human activity, etc.) that the released ammonia may be discharged to the atmosphere 
using a sufficiently high stack. 
 
Appendix K of IIAR 2 provides requirements and guidance to the application of an “Emergency 
Pressure Control System” for an ammonia refrigeration system to internally relieve overpressure 
in the system to another vessel in the system.  This prevents the operation of pressure relief 
devices causing the release of ammonia from the system.  If the internal relief of overpressure 
does not resolve the situation, the relief pressure valves will relieve the pressure.  The installation 
of pressure relief valves is required by the codes where the set pressure is determined in 
conjunction with the design pressure of the component at that location.  
4.0 Ammonia Capturing Methods 
For this study, several different ammonia capturing methods are being considered.  Some of 
these methods are used more than others.  The most commonly used capture method is 
discharging the ammonia into a water diffusion tank where it is absorbed.  Also considered is 
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burning the discharged ammonia using a flare system.  There are very few instances in the 
refrigeration industry where flares are used, but it is a common practice in the petrochemical and 
ammonia production industries.  Another method, which is not commonly being used for this 
application in industry, is a scrubber system.  For plants that are already using a cascade 
refrigeration system with both carbon dioxide and ammonia, there is a possibility of using carbon 
dioxide as the scrubbing agent instead of water.  Other chemical solutions can be used in 
conjunction with water as the scrubbing agent to improve effectiveness.   In some cases, the 
ammonia may be released directly to atmosphere through a sufficiently tall stack to reduce 
downwind ammonia concentrations to safe levels.   
4.1 Ammonia Dispersion into the Atmosphere 
In areas where it is safe and legal to do so, direct venting to the atmosphere is the cheapest, 
easiest and lowest maintenance method of mitigating an ammonia release.  In W.F. Stoecker’s 
handbook, Handbook of Industrial Refrigeration (1998), he reports that ammonia released to the 
atmosphere does not contribute to ozone depletion or global warming, and that ammonia is 
naturally occurring in air.  
 
By section 9.7.8 of Standard 15, the refrigerant must be discharged  
“at a location not less than 15 feet (4.57 m) above the adjoining ground level and not less 
than 20 feet (6.1 m) from any window, ventilation opening, or exit in any building.  The 
discharge shall be terminated in a manner that will prevent the discharged refrigerant 
from being sprayed directly on personnel in the vicinity and foreign material or debris 
from entering the discharge piping.” 
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Figure 1 shows a typical arrangement for an ammonia discharge stack at a refrigeration facility 
where minimum acceptable dimensions are shown. 
 
The IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health) for ammonia is 300 ppm (v/v) (CDC 
2012).  Generally, a value of one-half the IDLH is acceptable for downwind concentrations for 
designing and selecting capturing equipment for emergency releases of chemicals such as 
ammonia.   
 
Figure 1:  Schematic diagram of an ammonia discharge stack at a refrigeration facility 
showing minimum stack height above and adjacent to building structures. 
 
The main concern is having the plume disperse as quickly as possible to minimize the risk of 
damage downwind.  A concentrated ammonia cloud can be harmful and even deadly.    Stoecker 
(1998) reports that stack height and upward discharge velocity reduce downwind ground level 
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ammonia concentrations based on dispersion model predictions.  For the conditions that he 
investigated, a release rate of 20 lbm/min (0.15 kg/s), peak ground level concentrations were 
reduced by a factor of more than two by increasing the upward velocity by a factor of four 
(obtained by decreasing the stack inside diameter by a factor of two) where the stack height was 
20 ft (6 m).  Additionally, by doubling the stack height (from 20 ft (6 m) to 40 ft (12 m), the peak 
ground level concentration was reduced by 60%.  In all situations, the peak ground level 
concentrations were measured at a distance less than 330 ft (100 m) from the stack position.    
Fenton et al. (2001) completed a study for ASHRAE measuring the concentration of ammonia 
vapor downstream from more than 80 controlled releases, over varying weather stability classes, 
at two discharge heights: 6 ft (1.8 m) and 26.5 ft (8.1 m) above the ground, and 80 ft (24 m), 160 
ft (49 m), and 320 ft (98 m) downstream.  The objective of this research was to determine the 
influence of stack height, discharge upward velocity, and the ammonia concentration on the 
downwind dispersion of ammonia.  Release velocities were 32.8 ft/s (10 m/s) and 164 ft/s (50 
m/s).  Elevations were 6.5 ft (2.0 m) and 26.5 ft (8.1 m).  Concentrations of the ammonia vapor 
in air were 100% and 1% by volume.   All the ammonia releases were simulated using the then 
available EPA ISCST2 atmospheric dispersion model (1992).  The experimental data, supported 
by the ISCST2 predictions, showed that ground level ammonia concentrations were influenced 
the most by the discharge height.  As an example, Figure 2 shows measured downwind ammonia 
vapor concentrations from experiment HLL_5 (high ammonia vapor concentration source (pure 
ammonia vapor), low elevation (6 ft (1.8 m) above ground), and low velocity (33 ft/sec (10 
m/s)).  The ISCST2 model does adequately predict the general trend of the release for the six 
detector locations.  For the lower elevation detector locations, the ISCST2 predicts that the 
concentration of ammonia vapor decreases as the plume moves downwind.  This trend was 
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matched by the detector readings, although the values between the two were not an exact match.  
For the upper elevation detector locations, the model predicts that the concentration increases as 
the plume moves downwind, but that concentrations are low and under 10 ppm (v/v).   
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Figure 2: Comparison of measured and predicted downwind ammonia vapor concentration 
for release HLL_6 (pure ammonia source, 6.5 ft elevation above ground, 33 ft.sec upward 
velocity) (Fenton et.al. 2001). 
 
The experimental data collected by Fenton et al. (2001) indicated that increasing the elevation of 
the release, decreasing the ammonia concentration, and increasing the upward velocity at the 
source all individually reduce the downwind ammonia concentrations at ground level.  However, 
the data also shows that the plume rose, increasing the ammonia concentration at the detectors 
located at the high elevation.  The three ground level measurements showed approximately an 
80% reduction in concentration from the low to the high release elevation.  The next most 
effective source characteristic in reducing ground level concentration was the ammonia vapor 
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concentration, reducing the concentration by 50%.  The least effective source variable was the 
source ammonia vapor upward velocity, reducing concentration by 20% when going from a low 
velocity (32.8 ft/s (10 m/s)) to a high velocity (164 ft/s (50 m/s)).  These factors are based on the 
specific releases that were compared.  Also, the Fenton et al. (2001) release data suggested that 
the combined effect of decreasing source ammonia vapor concentration and increasing upward 
velocity have about the same effect as just increasing the source elevation.  Note these 
generalizations are based on the Fenton et al. (2001) experimental data and so are restricted to 
the specific changes made in the source characteristics for their project.   
 
Additionally, several studies have been done on predicting the effects and behavior of ammonia 
plumes.  The following studies utilize computer models available that adequately predict how the 
ammonia dispersion in plumes will occur: John Woodward’s, “Improving effect of Atmospheric 
Stability Class on Hazard Zone Predictions for an Ammonia Release (Woodward 1997)”; 
Geoffrey Kaiser’s paper, “Identification and Modeling of Worst-Case Scenarios for Ammonia 
Refrigeration Systems (Kaiser 1996)”; Anders Lindborg’s paper, “Risk Assesment on a Large 
Industrial Ammonia Refrigeration System in Central Copenhagen, Denmark. (Lindborg 2006).”   
 
In summary, the dispersion model predictions made by Stoeker (1998) regarding downwind 
ammonia vapor concentrations are supported by the experiments and ISCST2 dispersion model 
predictions conducted by Fenton et al. (2001).  Deviations between these two studies are within 
the normal variations of air dispersion studies.  According to Beychok (1995) a factor of 2 or 3 is 
an acceptable result.  Consequently, air dispersion models predicting the downwind 
concentrations of ammonia vapor are valid.  Depending on the amount of ammonia released, 
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whether the ammonia is an aerosol or a vapor, the weather conditions, and the surrounding 
topography, there are innumerable scenarios that can result from ammonia being discharged to 
the atmosphere. 
    
The experiments conducted by Fenton et al. (2001) only considered vapor ammonia.  From a 
casual survey conducted by Stoecker (1995), about half of the ammonia releases from relief 
valves contain liquid ammonia in the form of an aerosol. The ammonia from these discharges 
appeared similar to steam.  Ammonia aerosol can be generated by a sudden pressure drop in a 
vessel containing ammonia liquid caused by the opening of a pressure relief valve.  The 
ammonia liquid will boil in order to adjust to the pressure drop, forming vapor bubbles 
throughout the liquid.  The consequent violent agitation of the liquid generates droplets which 
are entrained into the vapor flow stream from the vessel and into the pressure relief piping 
manifold.  As the release of ammonia occurs, the aerosol leaves the stack at the point of 
discharge and enters the atmosphere, appearing as a “white” cloud (similar to steam).  The 
aerosol is a two-phase mixture of ammonia liquid and vapor, with the liquid dispersed into a 
large number of small droplets.  Because the ammonia liquid droplet is evaporating ammonia, 
the temperature of the ammonia droplet and the surrounding vapor is very cold (ammonia liquid 
at atmospheric pressure is nearly -28oF).  As a result, the density of the ammonia cloud greater 
than that of the ambient air.  The ammonia cloud descends to the ground level and remains there 
until it’s fully mixed with the ambient air.  The ammonia concentrations in the cold aerosol could 
be very high thus posing a dangerous hazard to all humans and animals that may come in contact 
with it.  The local topography and prevailing wind conditions are very important as it directs the 
movement of the cold aerosol cloud.      
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The monograph, Guidelines for Use of Vapor Cloud Dispersion Models (2nd Edition) (1996), 
provides a useful review of the dispersion models available at the time, including those which 
handle two-phase jet releases and 3-dimensional dispersion plumes.  Vapor cloud dispersion 
models are available that are capable of modeling ammonia aerosol releases, including the 
prediction of a cloud’s movement along the ground, as influenced by local topography and 
atmospheric winds.  Representative examples of these software packages are: CHARM (2012), 
DEGADIS (2012), and SLAB (2012). Application of software capable of predicting ammonia 
aerosol cloud behavior is outside the scope of this project.   
 
Wewers and Fenton (2011) have proposed a simple device that separates ammonia liquid from 
vapor in a discharge line.  Preliminary tests conducted by the Ammonia Safety and Training 
Institute (ASTI) (Smith 2011) have shown that the device, named “Ammonia Liquidator” does 
indeed capture a large fraction of the liquid portion of the ammonia vapor mixture before it 
enters the atmosphere. A device like this, inserted in the pressure relief manifold upstream from 
the discharge point, has the potential of trapping the liquid phase of the ammonia released, 
therefore reducing the liquid phase of an aerosol cloud.  The trapped ammonia liquid may be 
either reclaimed or disposed of by a procedure acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.   
 
An alternative approach for the dispersion of ammonia has been uncovered – namely moving the 
point of discharge to the top of an evaporative condenser.  This idea seems to have merit by the 
fact that the velocity of the air exiting the evaporative condenser is always upward and that the 
droplets in the airstream will absorb the ammonia, thereby reducing the ammonia concentration.  
14 
 
With careful review of this idea, several important safety issues remain.  The first is that the 
ammonia is still present in the evaporator’s plume and so as the water droplets evaporate, 
ammonia will also evaporate and become vapor.  This will increase the vapor concentration of 
the ammonia.  The ammonia flow rate during a release could overwhelm the evaporative 
condenser plume’s ability to handle it.  Further, when the ambient air’s relative humidity is high, 
evaporation will slow down, causing the ammonia-water droplets to settle out from the plume 
where the pH of the droplets will be approximately 12.  At this pH level, the droplets would have 
several negative effects upon settling, including damage to automobile paint finishes and human 
health hazards due to inhalation.  Conceivably, the evaporative condenser’s plume under high 
RH levels could migrate for considerable distances, exacerbated by low temperatures caused by 
the ammonia.  Second, the top of an evaporative condenser may not be in a position satisfying 
Standard 15’s criteria for location of the discharge point. 
4.2 Ammonia Absorption into Water Contained in a Tank 
This concept’s general requirements originate with ASHRAE Standard 15 (ASHRAE 2010) 
paragraph 9.7.8.2.b which states that if a water dilution tank is used, the water and ammonia 
quantities used must meet or exceed the stated amounts.   
“A tank containing one gallon of water for each pound of ammonia (8 kg of water for 
each kilogram of ammonia) that will be released in one hour from the largest relief device 
connected to the discharge pipe.  The water shall be prevented from freezing. The 
discharge pipe from the pressure-relief device shall distribute ammonia in the bottom of 
the tank, but no lower than 33 ft (10 m) below the maximum liquid level. The tank shall 
contain the volume of water and ammonia without overflowing.” 
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In some locations, it is required by code to discharge ammonia into a tank of water.  The 
California Mechanical Code section 1120.0 states,  
“Ammonia shall discharge into a tank of water that shall be used for no purpose except 
ammonia absorption. At least one gallon of fresh water shall be provided for each pound 
of ammonia that will be released in one hour from the largest relief device connected to 
the discharge pipe.”  
This rule had been in Standard 15 for some time without validation.  Upon the adoption of the 
BOCA Uniform Mechanical Code during the late 1980’s, ASHRAE initiated a research project 
to experimentally check the above recommendation in Standard 15.  The results of this project 
were reported by Fenton et al. (1991) where the ratio of one gallon of water for each pound of 
ammonia was confirmed for both liquid and vapor ammonia.  The study found that at ratios of 
one gallon of water to one pound of ammonia, the water was 90% effective at trapping ammonia 
vapor and 100% effective at trapping ammonia liquid.   The effectiveness of trapping ammonia 
vapor approaches 100% if the ratio of water to ammonia is increased. 
 
Figure 3 shows experimental results for the ammonia to water ratio given in Standard 15.  It 
shows that as the ammonia concentration reaches its maximum while being trapped in water, the 
ammonia to water ratio is very near the 1 lbm NH3 per gallon of water.  This approach to 
capturing ammonia released through pressure relief valves has been successfully implemented in 
many areas of the United States, but has posed challenges concerning relief piping design, 
equipment maintenance, disposal of captured ammonia, and freeze protection where needed.   
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Figure 3: Experimental results and model predictions of ammonia concentration in water 
for ammonia absorption into water ending at 1 pound of ammonia per gallon of water 
(Fenton et al. 1991). 
 
While the absorption of ammonia in water is a relatively passive system, there are some issues 
that must be addressed.  Standard 15 says that the water storage tank must be prevented from 
freezing, and that the ammonia must enter in the bottom of the dilution tank.  A rupture disk 
prevents the migration of moisture into the relief piping, preventing failure of the pressure relief 
valve caused by rust.  A schematic diagram of a water diffusion system is shown in Figure 4 
where the basic components are shown.  The released ammonia enters the top of the tank, is 
piped to near the bottom, and there contacts the standing water after leaving the distribution 
piping or sparger.  Mechanical agitation of the water to promote the ammonia’s absorption is not 
needed because of the high affinity between ammonia and water.  Figure 5 shows a “generic” 
water diffusion system as it would appear installed at a refrigeration plant.   
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Figure 4: Schematic diagram of a water diffusion tank for the absorption of ammonia into 
standing water. 
 
Diffuse
 
Ammonia Vent Rupture Disk 
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Figure 5: A generic water diffusion tank system as installed (Chapp 2012) 
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After the system is used, something must be done with the ammonia-water solution.  Stoecker 
(1998) suggests a few different methods for dealing with the leftover ammonia-water solution.  
Combining this information and the information obtained with several personal communications, 
several alternative approaches were discovered for the disposal of ammonia-water mixtures.  
Depending on the local Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ), it can be forbidden to dump the 
ammonia-water mixture into the storm water drain for environmental reasons which include 
potential harm to marine life.  Methods that may be acceptable are discussed below. 
1. Employ licensed hazardous waste transporters to remove and dispose the ammonia –
water mixture.  In some instances, it may be possible to reclaim the ammonia in the 
mixture and re-use it in the refrigeration plant.  Depending on the local AHJ, the 
ammonia-water mixture may be applied as an agricultural fertilizer when it is free of 
contaminants.  
2. If allowed and approved by the local AHJ, the ammonia-water mixture may be added 
(possibly diluted with water) to the sewer provided that ammonia quantities and 
concentration limits are adhered to.  A permit may need to be obtained to accomplish 
this. 
3. If the refrigeration plant has internal provisions to handle the ammonia-water mixture, its 
facilities can be used to hold the mixture in separate holding tanks and slowly drain to the 
on-site water treatment plant.   
4. Mixing the ammonia-water mixture with an acid such as citric acid or sulfuric acid, using 
appropriate concentrations may be useful.  The chemical reaction that occurs with the 
acid will neutralize the ammonia-water solution leaving an ammonium salt which is non-
hazardous and easily disposed.   
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5. The ammonia-water mixture could be distributed over an empty parking lot located 
several hundred feet from the closest neighbors.  The parking lot must not contain any 
drains leading to the storm water drains and local foot and vehicular traffic must be 
limited to a safe distance.  A caution is in order here, the ammonia mass leaving the plant 
facility cannot exceed 100 lb (45 kg) NH3 per 24 hour period. 
6. The ammonia-water mixture could be left open to the atmosphere. Desorption of 
ammonia from the ammonia-water mixture occurs due to the relatively high vapor 
pressure of ammonia over water.  Fenton et al. (1991) performed experiments using 55 
gal drums open to the atmosphere to estimate the desorption rate of ammonia.  Using 
several drums as controls containing only water, several other drums containing 
ammonia-water mixtures at the initial ammonia concentration of 10.1% were filled from 
about half to two-thirds of the drum’s internal volume.  The drums were stored outside 
for 50 days over the summer where the ammonia concentration dropped to 50-60% of the 
initial value.  Importantly, in practice the ammonia-water mixture must be drained after a 
release and replenished with fresh water so that the water diffusion tank may capture a 
subsequent ammonia release. Draining to holding tanks provides for a means to replenish 
and may allow desorption to occur.  Must check with the local AHJ for approval and take 
steps to ensure that not more than 100 lbs (45 kg) of ammonia vapor enters the 
atmosphere per 24 hour period.     
Reference Release:  Using the quantity of ammonia in the defined reference ammonia release, 
2,116 lb NH3 (959.8 kg) over a one hour period, the quantity of water standing in the tank cannot 
be less than 2,116 gal (8.0 m3).  However, with the likelihood of the ammonia being primarily 
vapor and knowing that only 90% of the ammonia would be captured, the water volume is 
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increased to 2500 gal (9.5 m3).  Allowing for sufficient volume above the water surface to 
accommodate the movement of the water and possible bubbling, the volume of the tank is 
doubled giving a final tank volume of 5000 gal (18.9 m3).   
4.3 Ammonia Dispersion into a Flare 
One alternative method of capturing ammonia from a release is burning the ammonia using a 
combustion flare system.  This method is commonly used in ammonia manufacturing plants and 
in the petrochemical industry, but is rare in the ammonia refrigeration industry.  The reason is 
that in these process industries, the source gas to be “flared” flows continuously, but variable in 
rate depending on the plant’s operating condition, providing modulated, but uninterrupted 
operation of the flare.  In a food refrigeration plant , the flare will only operate when one or more 
pressure relief valves are open releasing ammonia, or possibly when blowdown occurs at a rate 
or time when recovery is not possible.  Therefore, flares applied to refrigeration plants are 
generally classified as “emergency” flares because they only function when needed. 
 
Shepherd (1988) first reported the use of flares for the disposal of ammonia released from a 
refrigeration plant where he indicates the first application of flares to refrigeration plants was in 
1970 (Shepard 1988).  The combustion flame in the flare oxidizes the ammonia converting it to 
essentially water, nitrogen, and hydrogen. Since ammonia does not contain carbon, carbon 
compounds CO and CO2 do not appear in the products of combustion.  The flare does require 
careful design, as ammonia does not sustain a flame, even though the reaction is exothermic.  A 
pilot flame is needed to initiate and sustain the combustion of ammonia.   
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The simplest version of a flare is a “gas burner with a very large range that permits it to operate 
from very large flows of waste gas down to very small flows while maintaining its efficiency” 
(Shepherd 1988, 1990).  That efficiency is typically in the mid-ninety percent range, but in order 
for this level of efficiency to occur, any liquid ammonia must be removed from the relief system 
before it gets to the flare.  Ammonia droplets evaporate slowly due the liquid’s high latent heat, 
and they may pass through the flare without fully evaporating.  By this reason and because the 
combustion is often incomplete, ammonia may pass through the flare unburned.  Shepherd 
handles the ammonia liquid problem by piping the released ammonia through a phase separator 
or “knock-out drum” before it gets to the flare as shown by the vessel labeled “V-1” in Figure 6. 
 
Flaring systems have been used for decades in ammonia manufacturing plants, but there are 
notable differences in applying them to refrigeration systems.  The flare would not be used often, 
only operating when there is a release through the pressure relief valves of the refrigeration 
system.  In other flaring systems, the flare is used continuously.  The system must be able to lie 
dormant for long periods but be able to work immediately and effectively when challenged with 
ammonia.  It also must be able to handle a wide variety of flow rates of ammonia.  In an 
emergency release, the ammonia flow rate could be small or large.  Shepherd (1988) indicates 
that the turndown ratio (ratio between maximum and minimum fuel flow rate) of a flare system 
must be around 30,000 to 1.  In Shepherd’s diagram of the flaring system in Figure 6, a pressure 
controller on the phase separator controls the flow control valve on the natural gas line to 
regulate the amount of pilot gas supplying the flare.  To burn the ammonia efficiently, the 
ammonia and natural gas needs to be within a specific range of ratios.  The gas velocities at the 
flare tip usually range between 40 and 50 ft/s (12 and 15.2 m/s) and are shielded from the wind 
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by a shroud (Shepherd 1990).  Further, the location of the flare system must be outside of the 
facility buildings allowing it to be accessed by emergency personnel.   
 
Figure 6: Ammonia elevated open flare diagram (Shepherd 1990). 
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Figure 6 shows a diagram of an elevated stack flare, but other types of flares include: enclosed, 
horizontal, and pit (Shepherd 1988).  At the present time the efficiency of flares burning 
ammonia are reported to be greater than 98% according to two flare manufacturers (JohnZink 
Co. 2012, National Air Oil Burner Co. 2012).   
 
The flare system must be able to operate without electrical power or natural gas and be able to 
easily and reliably switch to backup systems because many fire departments will shut these off in 
the case of a fire or leak at an ammonia facility.  This can be done with a supply of propane to 
back up the ignition gas and a battery backup for the electrical parts.   This backup equipment 
requires maintenance and periodic testing to ensure its functionality. In contrast, the water 
diffusion tank, because water is always present, does not require backup equipment during an 
electrical power outage. 
 
The possibility that ammonia could be burned in a process steam boiler that was already 
operating on site is one potential way to reduce cost (Shepherd 1990).   No instances of on-site 
combustion boilers burning released ammonia were found.  One end user with four plants in 
California has installed combustion flares to burn the ammonia that may be released at the 
refrigeration plant (Faust 2012).  In these installations, the use of water diffusion tanks was 
avoided at the request of the owner.  The installation costs of the flare systems were somewhat 
greater than that of suitable water diffusion systems but operation and maintenance costs appear 
to be less.  The flares used in these four plants all use a pilot flame to initiate combustion in the 
event of an ammonia release.  Routine emissions testing of these ammonia flare systems is not 
required as they are not a continuous source.  While combustion flare systems are rare with 
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ammonia refrigeration plants serving the food industry, they are common in the ammonia 
production and petrochemical industries.   
 
As already mentioned, a pilot flame is needed to ignite the ammonia-air mixture and sustain the 
combustion in the flare.  The simple complete combustion reaction of ammonia in air is: 
 
where the combustion products are H2O and unreacted N2.  With the use of a hydrocarbon pilot 
fuel, the chemical reaction is complicated by the presence of the carbon.  Combining the 
ammonia and hydrocarbon fuel into a generic fuel molecule, the oxidation reaction becomes the 
combustion product species identified with unknown mole numbers 
 
where φ is the fuel-air equivalence ratio, ε is the H/C atom ratio in the fuel molecule, and ϑi are 
the product mole numbers.  All the shown product species appear during the combustion reaction 
at some point as chemical equilibrium is attained.  To the extent that oxygen is available, the 
reaction will produce CO and CO2, and due to the dissociation of nitrogen, NO2 will form in 
small quantities.  The other product species are intermediate and contribute to the final product 
mole numbers. A literature review by Fenton et al. (1995) found that as temperature increases, 
the lower flammability limit decreases and the upper flammability limit increases, widening the 
range where ammonia is flammable.  By contrast, increased humidity narrows the flammability 
range.  The normal flammability limits of ammonia are reported as 15.2% and 27.4% in dry air at 
room temperature.  By contrast, Khan et al (1995) measured the ammonia air flammability limits 
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as 16% and 26.6% at 100% RH.  Lubricating oils in the ammonia-air mixture can lower the 
flammability limits as much as 50% (Fenton 1995).   
 
Fenton et al. (1995) developed a laboratory sized ammonia flare system in the shape of a venturi 
where immediately downstream of the throat was placed a flame holder.  Natural gas was used as 
the pilot fuel and ammonia was supplied by regulating the flow from a storage tank by means of 
a gas pressure regulator.   Experiments were conducted consisting of varying the natural gas and 
ammonia flows over the full range of flammability for the two fuels.  The measured flame 
temperature ranged from a high 2100oF to a low of 1200oF for the ammonia–air mixture.  The 
higher temperature was achieved when fuel-air supply mixture was near stoichiometric 
conditions with lower temperatures coming when the fuels and ammonia supplies are 
unbalanced.  Emissions were measured downstream from the combustion zone including: NH3, 
CO, CO2, NOx, and total hydrocarbons (HC).  Oxygen was also measured downstream from the 
combustion zone.  Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12 show the 
measured downstream concentrations of O2, NH3, CO, CO2, NOx, and HCs, respectively.     
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Figure 8: Variation of ammonia (ppm, v/v) measured downstream from the combustion 
zone as a function of the fuel mixture (Fenton et al. 1995). 
Figure 7: Variation of oxygen concentration (%) measured downstream from the 
combustion zone as a function of the fuel mixture (Fenton et al. 1995). 
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Figure 9: Variation of carbon monoxide (ppm, v/v) measured downstream from the 
combustion zone as a function of the fuel mixture (Fenton et al. 1995). 
 
Figure 10: Variation of carbon dixoide (ppm, v/v) measured downstream from the 
combustion zone as a function of the fuel mixture (Fenton et al. 1995). 
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Figure 11: Variation of nitrous oxides (NOx) (ppm, v/v) measured downstream from the 
combustion zone as a function of the fuel mixture (Fenton et al. 1995). 
 
Figure 12: Variation of total hydrocarbons (HC) (ppm, v/v) measured downstream from 
the combustion zone as a function of the fuel mixture (Fenton et al. 1995). 
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NOx emissions were greater than 1200 ppm (v/v) when the fuel supply mixture was lean and 
below 12%.  Oxygen emissions decreased with increasing concentrations of natural gas and 
ammonia.  It was observed that the oxygen concentration was highest when the natural gas 
concentration was below 2% and the ammonia concentration was below 20% providing for lean 
combustion.  As the flame became rich and oxygen became scarce, CO2 concentrations 
decreased and CO concentrations increased, under some conditions greater than 16000 (ppm 
v/v). Importantly, the ammonia and total hydrocarbon concentrations remained low until the fuel 
mixture approached the upper flammability limit.   
 
The experimental flare was also challenged with liquid ammonia (Fenton et al. 1995).  When the 
combustion flame is operating at stoichiometric conditions, the addition of liquid ammonia 
pushes the concentration of the fuel mixture into the rich region.  The quantity of ammonia liquid 
could be great enough to exceed the concentration of the upper flammability limit thus 
quenching the flame.  It was observed that injecting liquid ammonia into a near stoichiometric 
air-natural gas pilot flame at an ammonia-to-natural gas mass ratios less than 0.5 gave ammonia 
exhaust concentrations less than 5 ppm (v/v).  However, as the mass ratio increased, the 
ammonia concentration in the exhaust stream increased to over 6000 ppm (v/v) before the flame 
quenched or extinguished.   
 
Fenton et al. (1995) also measured the influence of lubricating oils on the flammability limits of 
the ammonia air mixture.  Four oil types were tested and all significantly decreased the lower 
flammability limit while only slightly decreasing the upper flammability limit.  Measurements 
indicated that mineral, paraffinic, and other oils decreased the lower flammability limit to 12% 
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for the ammonia air mixture when the oil concentration in the ammonia was 20% by weight.  
Polyester oils were measured to decrease the lower flammability limit of the ammonia air 
mixture to 9.5%.    
 
Reference Release:  The stack height flare offers several advantages when applied to 
refrigeration plants.  The flaring combustor does not require warming to maintain a standby 
temperature, thus lowering its cost of operation.  Also, the elevated flare, if for some reason not 
operational at the time of a release, will disperse the ammonia to the atmosphere in the same 
manner as if discharged from the stack without treatment.  For the reference release of 2,116 lb 
NH3 vapor per hour, a 10 inch (25.4 cm) diameter flare tip size is appropriate requiring three 
pilots at a pressure drop of 4 inches water gauge.      
4.4 Ammonia Dispersion into a Scrubber 
A water spray scrubber system works similarly to the water diffusion tank in that the ammonia is 
absorbed into the water.  The scrubber is an active system rather than a passive system.  The 
water is sprayed into the ammonia as it enters the tank, rather than the water standing in the tank.  
In the event of a release, the end product is the same ammonia-water solution as in the water 
diffusion tank.  In Fenton et al. (1991) it was found that a water spray scrubber was “an 85% 
effective ammonia vapor trap at the ratio of two gallons water to one pound of ammonia.  This 
was a crudely designed device, and Fenton (2012) believes that a system that was specifically 
designed for the application would have an effectiveness approaching 100%, similar to the water 
diffusion tank. In line with that expectation, commercially available ammonia scrubbing systems 
claim over 99% effectiveness in capturing ammonia.  
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Although scrubbers are not commonly used in the ammonia refrigeration industry, there are 
commercially available scrubbers suitable for emergency service and several applications are 
already in place (Biondi 2012).   Many products use an acid-water solution instead of only water 
as the scrubbing agent (Advanced Air Technologies, Inc, 2012).  The most common acid used is 
sulfuric acid, because when reacted with ammonia, it forms ammonium sulfate, which is a salt, 
and a common fertilizer ingredient.  Additionally, sulfuric acid is low cost and has very low 
volatility.   With the salt precipitated out of the solution, the water in the scrubber system can be 
recycled and the ammonium sulfate can be used or sold.  Some commercial scrubbing systems 
use a “packed bed” system, as shown in Figure 13 to “provide intimate contacting of the upward 
flowing vapor and the downward flowing liquid (Beychok 2010).”  
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Figure 13: Diagram of a packed bed absorption column scrubber (Beychok 2010). 
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The emergency scrubber may, or may not, need dilution air to operate depending on its 
configuration.  In addition to the packed bed scrubber shown in Figure 13, spray chambers and 
water jets may also be suitable scrubber configurations for emergency service (Heil 2012).  
Figure 14 is a schematic diagram of a simple vertical packed-bed counterflow scrubber.        
Figure 14: Schematic diagram of an emergency scrubber suitable for capturing ammonia. 
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A unique opportunity may exist with industrial refrigeration systems that incorporate carbon 
dioxide and ammonia as refrigerants.  It is known that ammonia chemically reacts with carbon 
dioxide producing water and a substance that appears as a white powder or “snow.”  The 
chemical reaction is: 
  OHCO2)NH(CONH2 2223 +→+    
where the (NH2)2CO is ammonium carbamate (Minami 2012).  This reaction was explored with 
varying pressure, temperature and water concentrations with vapor reactants by Kivama and 
Minomura (1950).  With the stoichiometric ratio of ammonia and carbon dioxide (2–to-1), 
reactant temperatures below 264°F (129°C), and reactant pressures near one atm (14.7 psi), 
chemical reaction results in the formation of the powder ammonium carbamate.  When 
temperatures are greater than about 264°F (129°C), the above reaction begins to form urea, 
which has a chemical formula of CO(NH2)2 – the extent of which depends on the temperature 
and pressure.  It was also noted that water vapor concentrations greatly influenced this chemical 
reaction.    
 
With ammonia-carbon dioxide cascade refrigeration systems that utilize an interconnecting 
“cascade” heat exchanger, pressure transducers are placed in both the ammonia and carbon 
dioxide sides to trigger the occurrence of a leak causing the carbon dioxide to mix with the 
ammonia (Andrews 2012).  The above reaction occurs, forming the solid ammonium carbamate, 
thereby disrupting operation.  No cascade systems were discovered that utilize carbon dioxide as 
a means of trapping an ammonia release.  Despite this, the concept appears to have merit because 
both the ammonium carbamate and water are harmless and convenient to dispose of. 
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Reference Release:  The reference release is 2,166 lb (959.8 kg) NH3 vapor per hour.  The 
packed bed vertical configuration is used by manufacturers of emergency scrubbers for ammonia 
and is recommended for this study.  Water will be used as the scrubbing agent in the 
recommended concentration of the reference relief.   
4.5 Emergency Pressure Control System 
The International Mechanical Code section 1105.9 requires that an ammonia refrigeration system 
containing more than 6.6 pounds (3 kg) of ammonia have an emergency pressure control system 
as detailed in Section 606.10 of the International Fire Code.  This system requires that: 
  
“each high and intermediate pressure zone in a refrigeration system shall be provided with a 
single automatic valve providing a crossover connection to a lower pressure zone.”   
 
The valves are set to open automatically at 90% of the pressure set point for emergency pressure 
relief devices.  Also, all zones that are connected by a crossover valve must be designed to 
contain the maximum pressure achieved by connecting the two zones. The idea behind relieving 
pressure to another vessel, is to have the ammonia go from a higher pressure vessel to a lower 
pressure vessel and prevent it from needing to be released from the system. 
 
Because ECPS systems are now required by the codes, all up-to-date industrial ammonia systems 
incorporate internal pressure relief.  The consequence of these systems is that when ammonia is 
released to limit high pressures in vessels, the ammonia remains contained within the 
refrigeration system and not released through the relief valves to an open stack for dispersion to 
the air or an ammonia capturing system.  In the case of a major plant fire affecting all, or a large 
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enough portion, of the pressure vessels in the system, the EPCS could be overwhelmed, causing 
a failure of the system. 
 
Figure 15: Diagram showing the basic components of an ECPS internal pressure relief 
system (stop valves, flow strainers, and pressure gauges not shown.) 
5.0 Phase 1 Conclusions 
It is recommended that the ammonia capture methods to be examined further in Phase 2 include:  
1. Discharge into a tank containing standing water (absorption). 
2. Discharge into the atmosphere. 
3. Discharge into a flare (combustion). 
4. Discharge into a wet scrubber. 
5. Emergency Pressure Control System  
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As discussed above in the text of Phase 1, other ammonia capturing schemes have been explored, 
but either they have not been evaluated or implemented in the refrigeration industry, or they may 
have questionable technical merit. 
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Phase 2 
6.0 Phase 2 Introduction 
Phase two of this project is the quantitative risk analyses of the ammonia capturing methods 
defined in phase one.  The components of the quantitative risk analysis include modeling the 
downwind ammonia concentration from releases under various conditions, determining the cost 
associated with the downwind concentrations, determining a failure rate for each ammonia 
capturing method, and finding the relative cost of a release with each capture method.  Several 
different ammonia releases were modeled, including releases from three different heights, six 
different sets of atmospheric conditions, both the reference release rate and double the reference 
release rate, and split releases from two separate release points. 
7.0 Ammonia Dispersion Modeling 
In order to determine the off-site consequences of the ammonia release, the dispersion of the 
ammonia must be modeled.  Initially, the model selected was the model outlined in Workbook of 
Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates (Turner 1970).  This model allows the calculation based on a 
relatively simple and broad set of inputs.  Turner’s method allows modeling to be done using the 
stability classes developed by Pasquill (Pasquill 1961), based on broader weather characteristics.  
The major inputs required to use this model are the weather stability class, release rate, wind 
speed, and the stack height.  From this, the ammonia concentration can be calculated at any 
location downwind.   After testing this model in comparison to the results of “Dispersion of 
Ammonia Into the Atmosphere” (Fenton 2001), it was found to be an inadequate simulation.  
The results of the study did not match up very well with the results of the model.  The main 
cause for this is thought to be the Turner model’s inability to account for the properties of the 
40 
 
pollutant.  It treats all pollutants the same, and does not account for ammonia being a dense gas 
when released at cold temperatures. 
 
The model that was finally chosen was SLAB, which is specifically designed as a dense gas 
dispersion model. SLAB requires many of the same inputs as Turner’s model, but also requires 
the properties of the pollutant, the ambient and source temperatures and pressures, and other 
parameters.  The requirements for the input file will be described in detail in the next section.  In 
contrast to more complex models, such as CALPUFF PRO and AERMOD, SLAB does not 
require the surrounding terrain or the specific weather patterns to be modeled.  For the terrain, it 
uses a surface roughness parameter and for the weather, it uses Pasquill’s atmospheric stability 
classes.  CALPUFF PRO and AERMOD are the two models recommended by the EPA for 
atmospheric dispersion modeling, but they require extremely detailed weather and terrain inputs 
that are not conducive to the more general modeling needed for this application.  If ammonia 
dispersion modeling were necessary for a specific installation, a more detailed dispersion study 
could be done and combined with the other facets of this project to come up with a more precise 
QRA for that site. CALPUFF PRO and AERMOD also are not designed for use with dense 
gases. 
 
The SLAB model did a much better job than Turner’s model of replicating the measured results 
of Fenton’s dispersion study.  Figure 16shows that the Turner model overestimates the 
concentrations at the 8.1 meter receptor height for the low velocity ammonia release by a factor 
of about 10.  At the 2 meter receptor height, the Turner model estimates that there would be no 
ammonia at the given distances downwind.  The SLAB model follows the experimental data 
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rather closely at the 8.1 meter receptor, and slightly underestimates the concentrations at the 2 
meter receptors. For the high velocity release shown in Figure 17, the Turner model does not 
follow the actual profile at all for either the 8.1 meter or the 2 meter receptors.  The SLAB model 
slightly overestimates for the 8.1 meter receptor again, but follows very closely at the 2 meter 
receptor. 
 
 
Figure 16: Model comparisons to Fenton’s study, low velocity release 
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Figure 17: Model comparisons to Fenton’s study, high velocity release 
7.1 Model Input File 
Figure 18 comes from User’s Manual for SLAB: An Atmospheric Dispersion Model for Denser-
than-air Releases (Ermak 1990), and shows the definitions of each of the input variables for the 
model.  The model is a FORTRAN program and uses a text input file.  Note that all of the 
measurements are in imperial units, rather than English units. 
 
Figure 19 shows an example input file.  The 1st line is the spill source type, which is always ‘3’ 
for this project, representing a vertical jet or stack release.  The 2nd line is the numerical substep 
parameter, which determines the number of substeps during the program’s calculations.  1 is the 
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recommended value for computational stability, while 3 triples the number of substeps. With 
modern computer processors, the run time of the program is insignificant so 3 was chosen for all 
simulations.  The next 7 lines are source properties of the pollutant.  These values can be looked 
up in a table provided in the user’s manual (Ermak 1990).  The next two lines are the saturation 
pressure constants, which the program will calculate on its own if the values are left at their 
defaults of -1.0 for line 10 and 0.0 for line 11.   
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Figure 18: Input variable definitions 
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Figure 19: Sample input file 
 
Lines 12 through 17 are the spill parameters.  All of these except the source height will remain 
the same for all of the simulations in this project.  The source temperature is not input as the 
temperature of the ammonia while it is in the pressurized tank, but rather as the properties after it 
has fully expanded.  The source area is also treated as such.  Equation 2 and Equation 3, 
respectively, show how the source temperature and source area are calculated.   
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Equation 2: 
 
Equation 3: 
 
TS = Source Temperature (K) 
γ = Ratio of specific heats (Cp/Cv) 
Pa = Ambient pressure 
Pst = Storage Pressure 
Tst = Storage Temperature (K) 
Ar = Acual area of opening (m2) 
AS = Source area (m2) 
(Ermak 1990) 
 
It is important to note that if the calculated source temperature is less than the boiling point 
temperature, the program resets the source temperature to be equal to the boiling point 
temperature.  For the simulations in this project, the source duration is always input as 3600 
seconds, and the mass source rate is 0.5683 lbm/s (input as 0.2583 kg/s).  The instantaneous 
source mass is 0 for any jet or stack release.  The source height will be varied between 30 feet 
(9.14 m) for the direct release to the atmosphere, 20 feet (6.10 m) for the flare, and 10 feet (3.05 
m) for the scrubber and diffusion tank.  Line 18 is the averaging time for the ammonia 
concentrations.  This is important because the EPA has different limits on concentrations based 
on exposure time.  For this project, concentration averaging times of 10 minutes (input as 600 s) 
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and 1 hour (input as 3600 s) were simulated.  The next line sets the limit for downwind distance 
in the simulation, which was 6.21 miles (10,000 m).  The four lines of the input file following are 
the detector heights where the downwind concentrations are measured.  For these simulations, 
heights of 16.4 ft (5 m), 6.56 ft (2 m), and 0.13 ft (0.04 m) were selected to cover a range of 
heights that humans would typically live at. 
 
Line 24 sets the surface roughness parameter, which was set at 1.0.  The surface roughness can 
vary wildly based on the surrounding terrain, but 1.0 is in the range for an urban or suburban 
application, and was kept the same for each simulation.  Line 25 sets the height for ambient wind 
speed measurement, and was set at 6.56 ft (2 m).  The ambient temperature and relative humidity 
are set in lines 27 and 28.  They were maintained at 68°F (293.15 K) and 35% RH for all 
simulations.  Lines 26 and 29 control the wind speed and the Pasquill stability class.  The 
stability classes have a range of wind speeds and weather conditions they represent, and  shows 
how they were paired in the simulations. Some of the stability classes share a wind speed, but 
have different dispersion characteristics. The stability classes go from very unstable at Class A to 
very stable at Class F, and are dependent on the incoming solar radiation or the cloud cover at 
night, in addition to the wind speed.  The final line of the program is just a negative number that 
tells the program that the input file has terminated. 
Table 1: Stability and Wind Speed Relation 
Stability Class Wind Speed 
Class A 6.26 ft/s  (2 m/s) 
Class B 9.84 ft/s  (3 m/s) 
Class C 16.4 ft/s  (5 m/s) 
Class D 19.7 ft/s  (6 m/s) 
Class E 9.84 ft/s  (3 m/s) 
Class F 6.26 ft/s  (2 m/s) 
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7.2 Simulation Inputs 
A simulation was run for each combination of stability class, release height, and concentration 
averaging time for a total of 36 different simulations.  The combinations are listed below in .  
The rest of the input variables remained constant across all of the simulations, and are listed in .  
Note that in  and  the imperial units are shown first, with English units in parentheses, because 
the SLAB program requires the input to be in imperial units.  The release is characterized by the 
release rate calculated in section 1.1 of 2,116 lbm (959.8 kg) of ammonia released over the 
course of one hour.  The release was modeled through a stack with a 1 foot (0.3048 m) opening, 
and Equation 2 was used to calculate the ‘Source Area’ input required by the program.  
Similarly, Equation 1 was used to calculate the ‘Source Temperature’ variable, and the result is a 
number below the boiling point temperature.  The program automatically resets the source 
temperature to be the boiling point temperature in this case. 
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Table 2: Dispersion Modeling Simulation Combinations 
Combination Number Release Height Concentration avg. time Stability Class 
1 9.14 m (30 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class A 
2 9.14 m (30 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class B 
3 9.14 m (30 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class C 
4 9.14 m (30 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class D 
5 9.14 m (30 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class E 
6 9.14 m (30 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class F 
7 9.14 m (30 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class A 
8 9.14 m (30 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class B 
9 9.14 m (30 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class C 
10 9.14 m (30 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class D 
11 9.14 m (30 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class E 
12 9.14 m (30 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class F 
13 6.10 m (20 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class A 
14 6.10 m (20 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class B 
15 6.10 m (20 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class C 
16 6.10 m (20 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class D 
17 6.10 m (20 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class E 
18 6.10 m (20 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class F 
19 6.10 m (20 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class A 
20 6.10 m (20 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class B 
21 6.10 m (20 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class C 
22 6.10 m (20 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class D 
23 6.10 m (20 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class E 
24 6.10 m (20 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class F 
25 3.05 m (10 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class A 
26 3.05 m (10 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class B 
27 3.05 m (10 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class C 
28 3.05 m (10 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class D 
29 3.05 m (10 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class E 
30 3.05 m (10 ft) 3600 s (1 hour) Class F 
31 3.05 m (10 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class A 
32 3.05 m (10 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class B 
33 3.05 m (10 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class C 
34 3.05 m (10 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class D 
35 3.05 m (10 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class E 
36 3.05 m (10 ft) 600 s (10 minutes) Class F 
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Table 3: Inputs that remain constant across all simulations 
Variable Variable Description Value 
IDSPL Spill source type 3 – Vertical jet or stack release 
NCALC Numerical substep parameter 3 
WMS Molecular weight of source material (kg) 0.017031 
CPS Vapor heat capacity at constant pressure (J/kg-K) 2170 
TBP Boiling point temperature (K) 239.72  (-28.17°F) 
CMEDO Initial liquid mass fraction 0.0 
DHE Heat of vaporization (J/kg) 1370840 
CPSL Liquid heat capacity (J/kg-K) 4294 
RHOSL Liquid density of source material (kg/m3) 682.8 
SPB Saturation pressure constant -1.0 (default for program calc) 
SPC Saturation pressure constant 0.0  (default for program calc) 
TS Temperature of source material (K) 190.9528 (-115.96°F) 
QS Mass source rate (kg/s) 0.2666 (0.5878 lbm/s) 
AS Source area (m2) 3.86631 (12.687 ft2) 
TSD Continuous source duration (s) 3600 (1 hour) 
QTIS Instantaneous source mass (kg) 0 
XFFM Maximum downwind distance (m) 10000 (32808 ft) 
ZP(1) Height of concentration calculation (m) 10  (32.81 ft) 
ZP(2) Height of concentration calculation (m) 5 (16.40 ft) 
ZP(3) Height of concentration calculation (m) 2 (6.56 ft) 
ZP(4) Height of concentration calculation (m) 0.04 (0.13 ft) 
ZO Surface roughness height (m) 1 (3.28 ft) 
ZA Ambient measurement height (m) 2 (6.56 ft) 
TA Ambient temperature (K) 293.2 (68°F) 
RH Relative humidity (%) 35 
Pst Storage pressure (atm) 17.01 (250 psi) 
Pa Ambient pressure (atm) 1 (14.7 psi) 
Tst Storage temperature (K) 245.15 (-18.4°F) 
Ar Actual area of opening (m2) 0.3048 (1 ft) 
γ Ratio of specific heats (Cp/Cv) 1.307 
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7.3 Dispersion Modeling Output 
An example of the output file produced by SLAB is contained in Appendix A, and a description 
of all that is included can be found in the user’s manual (Ermak 1990).  The important part of the 
output file is the time-averaged volume concentrations, at the specified measurement heights.  
For each downwind distance, the model calculates an “effective half-width” for the ammonia 
plume.  This half-width is a parameter that represents the distance from the cloud centerline to 
the edge of the main part of the plume. The output file displays and calculates the average 
ammonia concentration at six multiples (0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5) of this effective half-width.   
This gives specifically defined concentrations at the x-y coordinates that are along those lines.  
Figure 20 shows these lines and demonstrates that further downwind, as the plume spreads, the 
distance between calculated coordinates increases.  Figure 21 shows the points at which there are 
actual calculated concentrations. 
 
In order to make use of the ammonia concentration data, and relate it to a population density, an 
area must be defined to be represented by each point.  To make it possible to superimpose 
multiple releases from different points, a linear interpolation was done in both the downwind and 
crosswind directions.  The result of the interpolations gave values for the ammonia concentration 
at intervals of 3.28 feet (1 m) for the entire footprint of the ammonia plume.  As a result, the 
defined area for each point is the same and is 10.76 ft2 (1 m2).  The reason for doing this is the 
irregularity of the locations for which the program output gives an explicit result makes it 
impossible to superimpose two releases from separate release points to get single concentration 
value. Equation 4 shows how the interpolation was done in the crosswind direction, and Equation 
5 shows how it was done in the downwind direction.  Note that the downwind interpolations 
were done using the concentrations calculated by the crosswind direction. 
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Figure 20: Lines of calculated concentration 
 
Equation 4: 
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Equation 5: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Locations of actual ammonia concentration calculations 
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7.4 Ammonia Dispersion Model Results 
Figure 22 is an example of the dispersion model output after converting the raw program output, 
which gives the concentration in volume fraction, to concentration in parts per million.  This is 
for the 16.4 foot detector for the 30 foot release under stability Class A.  To fit it on one page, it 
has been truncated after concentration begins to drop off. Figure 23 is the graph that shows the 
data from Figure 22.   Figure 24 and Figure 25 show the data for the 6.28 foot (2 m) and the 0.13 
foot (0.04 m) detectors.  As the detector heights get shorter, the concentration peaks further 
downwind, and the concentrations are lower.   
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Downwind Plume
Distance half-width y/bbc= y/bbc= y/bbc= y/bbc= y/bbc= y/bbc=
x (ft) bbc (ft) 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
3.3 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.3 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.4 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.5 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.6 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.7 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.8 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.2 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.4 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.7 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5.3 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5.7 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6.3 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6.9 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7.5 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
8.4 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
9.4 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10.5 6.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
11.8 7.9 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
13.5 9.1 5.2 3.6 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
15.4 10.5 18.6 12.8 4.2 0.6 0.0 0.0
17.6 12.2 48.4 33.3 10.8 1.7 0.1 0.0
20.2 14.1 97.5 67.0 21.8 3.3 0.2 0.0
23.3 16.4 159.0 109.0 35.4 5.4 0.4 0.0
26.9 19.1 218.0 150.0 48.7 7.5 0.5 0.0
31.2 22.1 261.0 180.0 58.4 9.0 0.6 0.0
36.4 25.8 282.0 193.0 62.8 9.6 0.7 0.0
42.3 30.0 279.0 192.0 62.2 9.5 0.7 0.0
49.2 34.8 258.0 178.0 57.7 8.8 0.6 0.0
57.7 40.7 228.0 157.0 50.9 7.8 0.6 0.0
67.6 47.2 195.0 134.0 43.5 6.7 0.5 0.0
79.1 55.1 163.0 112.0 36.4 5.6 0.4 0.0
92.8 64.0 135.0 92.8 30.1 4.6 0.3 0.0
108.9 74.1 110.0 75.5 24.5 3.8 0.3 0.0
128.0 86.3 88.9 61.1 19.8 3.0 0.2 0.0
150.3 100.7 70.9 48.7 15.8 2.4 0.2 0.0
176.8 117.5 55.6 38.2 12.4 1.9 0.1 0.0
208.0 137.5 42.8 29.4 9.6 1.5 0.1 0.0
244.8 161.1 32.4 22.3 7.2 1.1 0.1 0.0
average concentration (Parts per million) at (x,y,z)
 
Figure 22: Ammonia dispersion modeling concentration data 
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Figure 23: Concentration along plume half-width multiples, 30 foot release, 16.4 foot 
detector 
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Figure 24: Concentration along plume half-width multiples, 30 foot release, 6.56 foot 
detector 
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Figure 25: Concentration along plume half-width multiples, 30 foot release, 0.13 foot 
detector 
 
The difference made by the different atmospheric stability classes is shown in Figure 26, Figure 
27, and Figure 28.  These are graphs of the centerline concentrations for the 6 stability classes at 
each detector height for the 30 foot release. The major trends are that the least stable classes, A 
and B, have higher concentration peaks, but they occur over a shorter distance, while the most 
stable classes, E and F, have smaller peaks, but persist for a much longer distance.  
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Figure 26: Centerline concentrations by stability class, 30 foot release 
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Figure 27: Centerline concentrations by stability class, 20 foot release 
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Figure 28: Centerline concentrations by stability class, 10 foot release 
  
One important result of the dispersion modeling is that it shows much higher ammonia 
concentrations for the lower elevation releases.  This is a major design consideration.  In order to 
minimize the concentration of ammonia that people may be exposed to after a release, the higher 
above ground that the release occurs, the better.  Figure 29 and Figure 30 show a comparison of 
centerline concentrations for releases under stability Class B and a detector height of 6.56 feet (2 
m).  
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Distance
x (ft) 30 foot release 20 foot release 10 foot release
3.28 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.35 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.41 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.48 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.58 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.71 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.84 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.17 0.0 0.0 0.4
4.40 0.0 0.0 16.8
4.66 0.0 0.0 178.0
4.95 0.0 0.0 816.0
5.31 0.0 0.0 2210.0
5.74 0.0 0.0 4230.0
6.27 0.0 0.0 6330.0
6.86 0.0 0.0 7270.0
7.55 0.0 0.0 7870.0
8.37 0.0 0.0 8080.0
9.35 0.0 0.0 7930.0
10.5 0.0 0.0 7490.0
11.8 0.0 0.0 6850.0
13.5 0.0 0.3 6090.0
15.4 0.0 1.7 5290.0
17.6 0.0 7.1 4510.0
20.2 0.0 22.1 3790.0
23.3 0.0 52.9 3150.0
26.9 0.0 101.0 2650.0
31.2 0.1 161.0 2210.0
36.4 0.5 221.0 1850.0
42.3 2.2 269.0 1530.0
49.2 7.2 299.0 1270.0
57.7 17.0 310.0 1040.0
67.6 31.3 307.0 835.0
79.1 47.7 293.0 663.0
92.8 63.2 279.0 519.0
108.9 75.4 253.0 401.0
128.0 82.8 220.0 306.0
150.3 84.8 183.0 231.0
176.8 85.7 148.0 173.0
208.0 79.5 117.0 129.0
244.8 69.1 90.1 95.7
288.1 57.3 68.6 70.9
337.9 45.9 51.7 52.3
400.3 35.8 38.7 38.6
Centerline Concentration (PPM)
 
Figure 29: Comparison of releases under the same conditions at different release heights 
(table) 
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Figure 30: Comparison of releases under the same conditions at different release heights 
(graph) 
7.5 Correlating Ammonia Exposure with Health Cost 
The California Air Resources Board has a document that shows the financial cost associated with 
health effects caused by air contaminants (Air Resources Board 2006).  The table in Figure 31 
details these costs.  Combined with the data from an EPA publication outlining the Acute 
Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL) for ammonia (National Research Council of the National 
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Academies 2007), shown in Figure 32, a cost associated with an exposure to a certain 
concentration of ammonia has been defined.   defines which AEGL Classification is associated 
with each health event, and  shows the average cost for the health events associated with each of 
the AEGL Classifications.  The overall human health cost is calculated by Equation 6. 
 
Figure 31: Undiscounted Unit Values for Health Effects in US Dollars (Air Resources 
Board 2006) 
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Figure 32: Summary of AEGL Values for Ammonia (National Research Council of the 
National Academies 2007) 
 
Table 4: Table 4: Health Events Related to Ammonia Exposure Classification 
Health Event Associated Cost AEGL Classification 
Acute Bronchitis $440 AEGL-1 (nondisabling) 
Lower Respiratory Symptoms  $19 AEGL-1 (nondisabling) 
Work Loss Day $195 AEGL-1 (nondisabling) 
Minor Restricted Activity Day $62 AEGL-1 (nondisabling) 
School Absence Day $95 AEGL-1 (nondisabling) 
Cardiovascular Hospital Admission $44,000 AEGL-2 (disabling) 
Respiratory Hospital Admission $36,000 AEGL-2 (disabling) 
Premature Death $8,100,000 AEGL-3 (lethal) 
 
Table 5: Average Cost by AEGL Classification 
AEGL Classification Average Cost 
AEGL-1 (nondisabling) $162 
AEGL-2 (disabling) $40,000 
AEGL-3 (lethal) $8,100,000 
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Equation 6: 
 
  
 
 
 
An ammonia concentration was calculated at every point along a square grid spaced 3.28 feet (1 
m) apart.  These concentrations were calculated by linearly interpolating between the actual 
known points from the program output.  This was done in order to later overlap releases from 
different release points.  The original program does not generate outputs at regular intervals, 
making this impossible to do without manipulating the output.  For each newly defined point 
with an associated concentration, a representative area of 10.76 square feet (1 square meter) was 
assigned in order to cover all of the area affected. The representative area was summed based on 
the amount of area falling under a certain AEGL Classification, then multiplied by the average 
health cost for that AEGL classification, and then multiplied by the population density. For the 
calculations, a population density of 1000 people per square mile was used to simulate an urban 
area. Since there are data points for three different heights at which the released ammonia could 
affect humans, 16.4 feet (5 m), 6.56 ft (2 m), and 0.13 ft (0.04 m), the height with the maximum 
cost was chosen for each of those simulations.  The maximum cost was also chosen from the 10 
minute and 1 hour exposure times.  This will give a conservative estimate.  shows the calculated 
costs for each detector height for the 30 foot releases, and  and  do the same for the 20 foot and 
10 foot releases, respectively.   shows the maximum costs for each type of release.  
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Table 6: Human health costs for 30 foot ammonia releases 
30 Feet Maximum
Atmospheric Stability 10 min 1 hour 10 min 1 hour 10 min 1 hour Cost
Class A 964$          2,687$          152$          152$          148$       148$       2,687$          
Class B 508$          165$             182$          130$          175$       118$       508$             
Class C 164$          116$             96$            4$              76$          -$        164$             
Class D 48$            86$                -$          -$          -$        -$        86$                
Class E 267$          338$             23$            122$          -$        71$          338$             
Class F 643$          852$             39$            243$          -$        114$       852$             
16.4 feet (5 m) 6.28 feet (2 m) 0.13 feet (0.04 m)
 
Table 7: Human health costs for 20 foot ammonia releases 
20 Feet Maximum
Atmospheric Stability 10 min 1 hour 10 min 1 hour 10 min 1 hour Cost
Class A 48,740$    169,212$     2,928$      5,728$      1,634$    4,618$    169,212$     
Class B 62,222$    144,870$     2,732$      2,619$      944$       460$       144,870$     
Class C 5,936$      44,698$       244$          204$          237$       193$       44,698$       
Class D 2,968$      6,919$          150$          187$          128$       169$       6,919$          
Class E 8,519$      17,231$       539$          597$          514$       578$       17,231$       
Class F 17,264$    40,876$       1,508$      1,734$      1,437$    1,682$    40,876$       
16.4 feet (5 m) 6.28 feet (2 m) 0.13 feet (0.04 m)
 
Table 8: Human health costs for 10 foot ammonia releases 
10 feet Maximum
Atmospheric Stability 10 min 1 hour 10 min 1 hour 10 min 1 hour  Cost
Class A 43,070$    169,920$     75,339$    75,339$    6,751$    6,751$    169,920$     
Class B 19,177$    164,472$     82,999$    203,895$ 8,466$    23,027$ 203,895$     
Class C 6,747$      126,336$     39,734$    128,641$ 44,543$ 9,739$    128,641$     
Class D 5,799$      126,464$     52,447$    91,000$    8,328$    9,137$    126,464$     
Class E 61,221$    533,870$     178,331$ 220,356$ 23,135$ 26,370$ 533,870$     
Class F 402,224$ 1,499,712$ 360,230$ 349,441$ 67,732$ 72,107$ 1,499,712$ 
16.4 feet (5 m) 6.28 feet (2 m) 0.13 feet (0.04 m)
 
Table 9: Maximum cost for each release height 
Atmospheric 10 feet 20 Feet 30 Feet
Stability  Cost Cost Cost
Class A 169,920$     169,212$     2,687$          
Class B 203,895$     144,870$     508$             
Class C 128,641$     44,698$       164$             
Class D 126,464$     6,919$          86$                
Class E 533,870$     17,231$       338$             
Class F 1,499,712$ 40,876$       852$              
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7.6 Releases from Multiple Points 
To test the effect of releasing from multiple points instead of one single release point as shown 
earlier, the reference release was split in half and the two source points were placed 32.81 feet 
(10 meters) apart.  The two-point release is simulated as 17.635 lbm (NH3) (8 kg) per minute 
through each of the release points, which combines to be the same amount as the reference 
release rate.  Three different orientations of the release points, relative to the wind direction were 
tested: the wind in line with the release points, perpendicular to the line between the release 
points, and at a 45° offset.  This is shown in Figure 33.  Note that only one of the additional 
release points is used at one time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the dispersion model were superimposed over each other with an origin offset 
determined by the orientation of the release points.  The output of the model calculates the 
maximum concentration for a ten minute period so for different points, the maximum 
concentration happens at different times.  In superimposing the results from the two release 
points, the maximum concentrations were added, even though they might have occurred at 
different times.  This gives a concentration that will almost always be slightly higher than the 
Figure 33: Orientation of Multiple Release Points 
In Line Source 
45° Offset Source 
Perpendicular 
Source 
Original Source 
32.81 feet 
32.81 feet 
32.48 feet 
Wind 
Direction 
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actual concentration over any time period.  The output of the SLAB model does not allow for the 
calculation of the exact concentration at any particular time, so this method was used.   
 
, , and  show the maximum ammonia concentrations for each release type.  In most cases, 
splitting the release into two sources reduces the maximum concentration, although for more 
stable atmospheric conditions, the model indicates that the maximum concentration could 
actually be increased for the releases from greater elevation.   
 
In every case, the maximum concentrations of the split releases were from the inline release, 
while the perpendicular release has the lowest concentration.  This is a result of the inline release 
causing more overlapping in the downwind ammonia concentrations that the release points 
oriented perpendicular to the wind or at a 45 degree offset. 
 
Table 10: Maximum concentrations comparing split to single release, 30 foot release 
30 foot release
Atmospheric Stability Single Release Pt. Inline Perpendicular 45° Offset
Class A 282 313 204 259
Class B 241 229 135 169
Class C 122 124 75 91
Class D 44 68 47 53
Class E 66 110 78 88
Class F 61 110 85 92
Maximum Concentration (PPM) for Various Release Types
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Table 11: Maximum concentrations comparing split to single release, 20 foot release 
20 foot release
Atmospheric Stability Single Release Pt. Inline Perpendicular 45° Offset
Class A 5460 3899 3449 3556
Class B 4920 3264 2656 2677
Class C 2290 1904 1301 1302
Class D 423 684 382 388
Class E 512 956 505 523
Class F 410 902 453 501
Maximum Concentration (PPM) for Various Release Types
 
 
Table 12: Maximum concentrations comparing split to single release, 10 foot release 
10 foot release
Atmospheric Stability Single Release Pt. Inline Perpendicular 45° Offset
Class A 8980 6362 5680 5787
Class B 8080 4963 4191 4215
Class C 4100 3065 2313 2316
Class D 4910 3253 2502 2503
Class E 7160 5722 4097 4098
Class F 7610 6436 3757 3757
Maximum Concentration (PPM) for Various Release Types
 
 
, , and  
 
 show the cost for each release type.  It turns out to be quite a bit higher in several cases.  This 
happens because although the average ammonia concentration may be reduced, a greater area 
could have a concentration exceeding the AEGL threshold values.  For example, if an area has an 
ammonia concentration of 500 PPM over a 10 minute period, it is classified as AEGL-2 and if 
another area has a concentration of 1500 PPM over a 10 minute period, it is also classified as 
AEGL-2.  Since they are the same AEGL classification, they each have the same associated cost, 
despite one having three times the concentration level.  Many of the split releases reach the 
threshold concentration values over a larger area than the corresponding single point releases, 
and therefore have higher costs than the reference release.  Splitting the release is only effective 
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in cases where the concentration is lowered enough to drop the AEGL classification over a 
significant portion of the affected area.   
Table 13: Maximum costs of various release types, 30 foot release 
30 foot release
Atmospheric Stability Single Release Pt. Inline Perpendicular 45° Offset
Class A 2,687$                      2,200$                  1,675$               1,812$          
Class B 508$                          419$                      204$                  201$             
Class C 164$                          167$                      162$                  161$             
Class D 86$                            111$                      89$                     97$                
Class E 338$                          439$                      423$                  425$             
Class F 852$                          1,218$                  1,184$               1,178$          
Maximum Cost for Various Release Types
 
Table 14:  Maximum costs of various release types, 20 foot release 
20 foot release
Atmospheric Stability Single Release Pt. Inline Perpendicular 45° Offset
Class A 169,212$                  182,652$              126,311$          138,648$     
Class B 144,870$                  126,851$              52,211$            70,708$       
Class C 44,698$                    39,065$                7,858$               7,928$          
Class D 6,919$                      7,788$                  7,073$               7,404$          
Class E 17,231$                    81,183$                19,739$            19,109$       
Class F 40,876$                    47,218$                48,869$            47,129$       
Maximum Cost for Various Release Types
 
Table 15: Maximum costs of various release types, 10 foot release 
10 foot release
Atmospheric Stability Single Release Pt. Inline Perpendicular 45° Offset
Class A 169,920$                  240,679$              159,796$          184,413$     
Class B 203,895$                  223,157$              111,635$          129,763$     
Class C 128,641$                  148,179$              42,687$            45,405$       
Class D 126,464$                  168,646$              70,746$            69,726$       
Class E 533,870$                  502,856$              267,541$          282,024$     
Class F 1,499,712$              1,426,486$          1,031,697$      1,274,687$ 
Maximum Cost for Various Release Types
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7.7 Varying the Reference Release 
The effects of doubling and halving the reference release rate were also modeled.  The doubled 
release rate is 70.53 lbm NH3 (32 kg) per minute, while the halved release rate is 17.64 lbm NH3 
(8 kg) per minute. This could be useful in designing a mitigation system for a larger or smaller 
refrigeration system.  , , and  compare the maximum costs for the different release rates at each 
release height.  Interestingly, in all cases, the cost associated with the double release was more 
than double that of the reference release and the cost associated with the half release was always 
less than half of the reference release.  The doubled release causes ammonia concentrations to be 
in the AEGL-2 (disabling) and AEGL-3 (fatal) classifications over a larger area than the 
reference release. Since the AEGL-2 and AEGL-3 classifications are many times more costly 
than the AEGL-1 level, the maximum costs increase by between two and thirteen times, 
depending on the release height and atmospheric stability conditions. Figure 34, Figure 35, and 
Figure 36 are graphical representations of this data.  While the cost is not linearly related to the 
release rate, it is reasonable to expect that a release rate in between any of these measured 
releases would have a cost that falls somewhere in between as well.  The lines are included 
between points on the graphs to easily connect the points simulated under the same atmospheric 
conditions and are not meant to indicate a linear relationship between the cost and release rate. 
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Table 16: Comparing costs of varied release rates, 30 foot release rates 
30 foot Half Reference Double
release 17.64 lbm 35.27 lbm 70.54 lbm
Class A 77$                2,687$          10,118$        
Class B 76$                508$              6,569$          
Class C 47$                164$              820$              
Class D 8$                  86$                308$              
Class E 103$              338$              1,035$          
Class F 267$              852$              2,779$           
Table 17: Comparing costs of varied release rates, 20 foot release rates 
20 foot Half Reference Double
release 17.64 lbm 35.27 lbm 70.54 lbm
Class A 78,162$        169,212$     370,781$     
Class B 41,012$        144,870$     334,721$     
Class C 3,386$          44,698$        227,553$     
Class D 3,107$          6,919$          58,500$        
Class E 7,855$          17,231$        119,892$     
Class F 18,443$        40,876$        95,906$         
Table 18: Comparing costs of varied release rates, 10 foot release rates 
10 foot Half Reference Double
release 17.64 lbm 35.27 lbm 70.54 lbm
Class A 98,076$        169,920$     504,361$     
Class B 73,598$        203,895$     501,374$     
Class C 35,828$        128,641$     410,995$     
Class D 10,413$        126,464$     411,116$     
Class E 178,068$     533,870$     1,243,062$  
Class F 620,264$     1,499,712$  3,266,198$   
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Figure 34: Comparing costs of varied release rates, 30 foot release 
 
Figure 35: Comparing costs of varied release rates, 20 foot release 
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Figure 36: Comparing costs of varied release rates, 10 foot release 
 
8.0 Failure Risk and Cost of System Failure 
Now that the cost of various ammonia releases has been calculated, the chance of the mitigation 
system allowing a release must be calculated.  For the water diffusion tank, flare, and scrubber 
systems, a failure of a part in the system will cause a release.  For the Emergency Pressure 
Control System, a failure will lead to one of the other mitigation systems.  For the direct 
discharge to atmosphere, any time ammonia is released from the refrigeration system through the 
relief vents, it will be discharged to the atmosphere. 
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To assess the risk of system failure, we will use Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data 2011 
(Denson 2011).  In addition to the cost of replacing a failed part, a failure of the ammonia 
capturing method will lead to some sort of unmitigated or partially mitigated ammonia release.   
For the purposes of this project it is assumed that a failure of an essential part of the release 
mitigation system will cause an unmitigated ammonia release.  If a part has a redundant part that 
will take over the function in case of failure, then it will take both of those parts failing 
simultaneously to cause an unmitigated release.  Similar to a circuit diagram, redundant parts are 
calculated in parallel with each other, and each part is calculated in series.  For example, if there 
is a system with parts A, B, C that are independent, and D and E that are in parallel, with failure 
rates fA, fB, fC, fD, and fE,   Figure 37 shows a diagram of the system, and Equation 7 shows how 
the failure rate would be calculated. 
 
Figure 37:  Example failure path diagram 
 
Equation 7: 
     
 
Since all of the failure rates are smaller than one, Equation 5 clearly shows that the failure rate 
can be significantly reduced if redundant parts are introduced for the least reliable parts of the 
system.   
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Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data 2011 (Denson 2011) gives the failure rate of parts in terms 
of failures per million hours.  For this application, a well maintained system could have a much 
lower failure rate because the system is used intermittently.  If a part was found to be defective 
or damaged during regular maintenance, it could be repaired or replaced without an overpressure 
event occurring so there would be no ammonia release.  As a result, the failure rates listed below 
probably are overestimated for what would cause a failure of the system in time of operation, but 
based on feedback from the industry, it is known that these systems are not always properly 
maintained.  Figures 38 through 42 show the failure path diagrams and Tables 19 through 24 
failure rates for the parts involved in the 5 different release mitigation systems. 
8.1 Failure Risk: Discharge to Atmosphere 
The discharge to atmosphere is the simplest system, and is the most reliable.  There are very few 
parts involved that have the potential to fail; however, ammonia is always released, so the failure 
rate does not end up being used in the calculations. 
 
Figure 38: Failure path diagram for Discharge to Atmosphere 
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Table 19: Failure rates for discharge to atmosphere 
 
8.2 Failure Risk: Water Diffusion Tank 
The water diffusion tank has eight parts that could fail and cause a release.  The parts that are 
most likely to fail are the tank itself and the manway.  People in the industry have expressed 
concern about the rupture disk being the main source of problems, but according to the data, it is 
only the third most likely to fail. 
 
Figure 39: Failure Path Diagram for Water Diffusion Tank 
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Table 20: Failure rates for water diffusion tank system parts 
Water diffusion tank
Page Parts Failures per million hours
2-632 Pipe and tubing, pipe 2.477463
2-285 Diffuser 2.632306
2-289 Rupture Disk 4.289581
2-923 Tank, Receiver 13.991493
2-979 Butterfly Valve; Normally closed 0.448059
2-977 Ball Valve 1.505089
2-297 Manway (door, access) 20.89821
2-977 Ball Valve 1.585089
Total failures per million hours: 47.83  
 
8.3 Failure Risk: Scrubber 
The scrubber is a more complicated system, with fifteen parts that are essential to the function of 
the system.  It requires electric power to operate, and must have a battery backup system in 
place.  The pump is the most likely to fail out of all of its parts, but there are quite a few parts 
with a relatively high failure rate.  Not surprisingly, since it is more complex, the scrubber is 
significantly more likely to fail than the water diffusion tank. 
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Figure 40: Failure path diagram for scrubber 
  
 
Table 21: Failure rates for scrubber system parts 
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8.4 Failure Risk: Flare 
The flare is the most complicated of all the systems, and has eighteen parts that could fail and 
cause a release.  The least reliable parts are the two valve position controls that control the valves 
for the gas leading to the pilot flame and the main gas line for the incinerator. These valves 
regulate the amount of gas necessary based on the ammonia flow rate. These two parts alone 
account for over half of the failure rate for the flare. 
 
 
Figure 41: Failure path diagram for flare 
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Table 22: Failure rates for flare system parts 
 
 
8.5 Failure Risk: Emergency Pressure Control System 
The Emergency Pressure Control System is a fairly simple system, with only 5 parts; however 
the two pressure regulating valves have a high failure rate, so the overall system failure rate is 
close to as high as the scrubber and flare. 
 
Figure 42: Parts for Emergency Pressure Control System 
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Table 23: Failure rates for emergency pressure control system parts 
Emergency Pressure Control System
Page Parts Failures per million hours
2-632 Pipe and tubing, pipe 2.477463
2-994 Valve, regulating, fluid pressure 51.704197
2-994 Valve, regulating, fluid pressure 51.704197
2-794 Sensor, Pressure 2.394713
2-794 Sensor, Pressure 2.394713
Total failures per million hours: 110.68  
 
8.6 Failure Risk: System Comparison 
For each of these systems, all of the parts except the gas and power supplies are essential, and 
there are no redundant parts built in.  In order to try to make some of the systems more reliable, 
some redundant parts will be added later.  Figure 60 shows the combined failure rates for all of 
the systems and what the result of a failure is in terms of a release.  For the EPCS, a failure will 
result in a release that will go to one of the other mitigation systems, while for the four remaining 
systems, a failure will result in an unmitigated release to atmosphere. Note that the direct 
discharge to atmosphere will always result in a release, so its failure rate is set at 100%, even 
though the system is not actually failing to do what it was designed to do. 
Table 24: Failure rates for each mitigation system 
Release Mitigation System Failures / million Failures / year Failure release result
Discharge to atmosphere 1000000 8760 30 foot release
Scrubber 127.972 1.121 10 foot release
Flare 162.281 1.422 20 foot release
Water diffusion tank 47.827 0.419 10 foot release
EPCS 110.675 0.970 Goes to other mitigation  
 
In order to compare the five systems, it is important to know a relative failure rate for each 
system, and a relative cost of failure for each.  To find a relative cost of failure for each, the 
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average cost of failure for all stability classes for the associated release height was compared.  To 
find the overall relative cost, the relative failure rate was multiplied by the relative cost of 
release.  The water diffusion tank was taken as the baseline for comparison.  The EPCS was not 
included because it will be used in conjunction with another mitigation system, and will serve to 
greatly reduce the risk of a release.  The results are tabulated in .  For comparison, the results for 
double the reference release, and half the reference release were included as well in  and .  As 
before, the costs are based on a population density of 1000 people per square mile. 
Table 25: Relative cost of release by mitigation system—reference release 
Relative Cost of Relative cost
Release Mitigation System Failure Rate a release  of  a release Relative Cost
Discharge to atmosphere 20,909              772.37$              0.0017              36.3925           
Scrubber 2.68                   443,750.43$     1.0000              2.6757             
Flare 3.39                   70,634.56$        0.1592              0.5401             
Water diffusion tank 1.00                   443,750.43$     1.0000              1.0000              
Table 26: Relative cost of release by mitigation system—doubled reference release 
Relative Cost of Relative cost
Release Mitigation System Failure Rate a release  of  a release Relative Cost
Discharge to atmosphere 20,909              3,604.91$          0.0034              71.3639           
Scrubber 2.68                   1,056,184.32$  1.0000              2.6757             
Flare 3.39                   201,225.43$     0.1905              0.6464             
Water diffusion tank 1.00                   1,056,184.32$  1.0000              1.0000              
Table 27: Relative cost of release by mitigation system—half reference release 
Relative Cost of Relative Cost
Release Mitigation System Failure Rate a Release of a Release Relative Cost
Discharge to Atmosphere 20909 96$                0.0006 4.54
Water Diffusion Tank 1.00 169,375$     1.0000 0.38
Flare 3.39 25,328$       0.1495 0.19
Scrubber 2.68 169,375$     1.0000 1.02  
 
This shows that the relative cost of direct discharge to atmosphere far exceeds that of the other 
systems.  On the other hand, the cost of an individual release that is directly discharged to 
atmosphere at a height of thirty feet, instead of due to a failure in one of the other systems at a 
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lower height, is very small.  Used in conjunction with an EPCS, the direct discharge to 
atmosphere would be a very favorable option because there would very rarely be a release, and 
when there was, the impact would be minimized by the high elevation release. 
The flare is the only mitigation system that performs better than the water diffusion tank in terms 
of relative cost.  It has a slightly higher failure rate than either the scrubber of water diffusion 
tank, but the cost of a failure leading to release is significantly less than that of the other two 
methods.  The relative cost for the flare is 54% of the water diffusion tank at for the reference 
release, while it is 65% for the doubled release.  The scrubber does not perform as well as the 
flare or the water diffusion tank, but by installing redundant backup parts, the failure rate can be 
greatly reduced making the scrubber nearly equivalent to the others.   
 
8.7 Release Mitigation System Modifications 
Figure 43 and  show the failure path diagram and the part failure rates for the modified scrubber 
system.  To make the system more resistant to failure, a backup pump was installed, and backup 
liquid level switches were added.  The added pump improves the robustness of the system 
significantly, as that component was responsible for 28% of the failures of the original system.  
With the redundant pump installed, the chance of both pumps failing at the same time is so small 
that the pump is responsible for less than 1% of the system failures.  The failure rate of the single 
pump failing is 36.1 failures per one million hours, but with the redundant pump installed, the 
rate of failure for that branch becomes much less than one failure per one million hours.  The 
chance of both pumps failing is so small that the pumps go from being the main source of failure 
to a very minute portion. The redundant switches do not have nearly that great an impact, but 
they are relatively inexpensive and easy to install, so it is a worthwhile change.   
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Figure 43: Modified Failure path diagram for scrubber 
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Table 28: Failure rates for scrubber system parts 
Scrubber
page Parts Failures per million hours
2-285 Bubble diffuser system 2.632306
2-923 Recirculation tank 13.991493
2-683 horizontal mag drive recirculation pump 7.5 hp 36.054515
2-683 horizontal mag drive recirculation pump 7.5 hp 36.054515
2-443 plate and frame heat exchanger 14.307564
2-632 CPVS recirc piping schedule 80 0.575243
2-894 1 recirculation flow low alarm switch 12.728835
2-895 liquid level maintenance switch 3.133598
2-895 liquid level maintenance switch 3.133598
2-895 liquid level low alarm switch 3.133598
2-895 liquid level low alarm switch 3.133598
2-895 liquid level high alarm switch 3.133598
2-895 liquid level high alarm switch 3.133598
2-225 water make-up solenoid valve 11.352988
2-556 upper tower water feed flow meter 15.574868
2-225 upper tower water recirculation shutoff solenoid valve 11.352988
2-878 power supply 13.991493
2-533 battery backup 20.486154
Total failures per million hours: 82.52  
The flare and water diffusion tank could be modified somewhat, but there are not any changes 
that would bring significant improvement that would also be reasonable modifications to the 
system.  The failure rate of the scrubber was reduced to 65% of its original value, but because of 
the lower release height, the relative cost is still quite a bit larger than the flare or the water 
diffusion tank.  With a stack added to the scrubber so that a release associated with a failure 
happened at 20 feet instead of the 10 feet, the relative cost is greatly improved.  This also 
improves the cost for the water diffusion tank as well. Figure 44 is a plot of the relative costs of 
the systems for the reference release.  shows the new relative costs including the modified 
scrubber system.   and  do the same for the doubled and half reference releases. 
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Table 29: Relative cost of release by mitigation system—reference release 
Relative Cost of Relative Cost
Release Mitigation System Failure Rate a Release of a Release Relative Cost
Discharge to Atmosphere 20909 772$             0.0017 36.39
Water Diffusion Tank 1.00 443,750$     1.0000 1.00
Water Diffusion Tank, 20 Foot Stack 1.00 70,635$       0.1592 0.16
Flare 3.39 70,635$       0.1592 0.54
Scrubber 2.68 443,750$     1.0000 2.68
Modified Scrubber 1.73 443,750$     1.0000 1.73
Modified Scrubber, 20 Foot Stack 1.73 70,635$       0.1592 0.28  
Table 30: Relative cost of release by mitigation system—double reference release 
Relative Cost of Relative Cost
Release Mitigation System Failure Rate a Release of a Release Relative Cost
Discharge to Atmosphere 20909 3,605$          0.0034 71.37
Water Diffusion Tank 1.00 1,056,184$ 1.0000 1.00
Water Diffusion Tank, 20 Foot Stack 1.00 201,225$     0.1905 0.19
Flare 3.39 201,225$     0.1905 0.65
Scrubber 2.68 1,056,184$ 1.0000 2.68
Modified Scrubber 1.73 1,056,184$ 1.0000 1.73
Modified Scrubber, 20 Foot Stack 1.73 201,225$     0.1905 0.33  
Table 31: Relative cost of release by mitigation system—half reference release 
Relative Cost of Relative Cost
Release Mitigation System Failure Rate a Release of a Release Relative Cost
Discharge to Atmosphere 20909 96$                0.0006 11.89
Water Diffusion Tank 1.00 169,375$     1.0000 1.00
Water Diffusion Tank, 20 Foot Stack 1.00 25,328$       0.1495 0.15
Flare 3.39 25,328$       0.1495 0.51
Scrubber 2.68 169,375$     1.0000 2.68
Modified Scrubber 1.73 169,375$     1.0000 1.73
Modified Scrubber, 20 Foot Stack 1.73 25,328$       0.1495 0.26  
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Figure 44: Relative cost of release by mitigation system—reference release 
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Conclusions 
The dispersion modeling showed that the most effective way of decreasing the impact of an 
ammonia release is by increasing the height at which the ammonia is released.  Increasing the 
height to just thirty feet from ten feet dramatically changes the impact on the human population 
in the area because the ammonia disperses to lower concentrations by the time it reaches near 
ground level where people live.  This is a drawback to both the scrubber system and the water 
dispersion tank.  If they fail, leading to an ammonia release, the ammonia is released much closer 
to the ground than if the flare fails to burn off the ammonia or if the ammonia is discharged 
through a thirty foot tall stack. 
 
When the expected cost of an ammonia release was factored in with the probability of a 
mitigation system failure, the flare is the best option, with a relative cost of 65% of the water 
diffusion tank.   It has a relative failure rate that is higher than that of the scrubber or the water 
diffusion tank, but because of the higher release height, the downwind ammonia concentrations 
are reduced significantly compared to the scrubber or diffusion tank.  The water diffusion tank 
was the next best option, followed by the scrubber.  Direct discharge to atmosphere causes the 
highest consequent human costs despite its relatively low cost of an individual release, because it 
allows a release every time ammonia leaves the refrigeration system through the relief valves. 
When the scrubber and diffusion tank are modified to include a 20 foot stack, similar to that of 
the flare, they each perform better than any of the original systems.  The water diffusion tank 
with a 20 foot stack becomes the most effective system of the ones modeled, with a relative cost 
of only 16% of the original water diffusion tank.   
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The water diffusion tank was shown to have the lowest failure rate of the mitigation systems, 
followed by the scrubber and then the flare.  Those in the industry have voiced concerns that the 
water diffusion tanks are not generally well maintained, so it could be that they are not quite as 
reliable as this study indicates. On the other hand, the flare and scrubber systems are more 
complicated and will likely require more diligent maintenance than the water diffusion tank to 
operate as intended. 
 
When any of these systems are used in conjunction with an Emergency Pressure Control System 
(EPCS), there will very rarely be a failure leading to an ammonia release.  The EPCS has a fairly 
low failure rate, so it would be highly unlikely that the EPCS would fail, followed by the 
secondary mitigation system failing.  With a properly working EPCS installed, any of the other 
mitigation systems could be used, depending on designer preference.  The water diffusion tank 
would probably be cheaper to install and maintain than the flare or scrubber, but any of the three 
could be used.  Depending on the local population density surrounding the plant, discharging the 
ammonia directly to the atmosphere through a tall stack could be a very good option, when used 
with the EPCS to prevent most releases. 
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